“The power of the press in America is a primordial one. It sets the agenda of public discussion; and this sweeping political power is unrestrained by any law. It determines what people will talk and think about—an authority that in other nations is reserved for tyrants, priests, parties and mandarins.”Theodore White
The above quote, from noted political analyst Theodore White, framed the mass media’s ability to influence its viewers in slightly chilling, almost totalitarian tones. Journalism professors Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw used somewhat less insidious tones when they constructed their “agenda-setting” theory, first referred to in 1972 in the days of the Watergate scandal. In the decades that have followed, media analysts have persisted in examining the ways that mass communication outlets present what is seen and heard as news, digging for truth and attempting to ferret out bias and corruption. Former CNN and ABC News producer Danny Schechter fired his salvo at this large moving target with the 2004 documentary film Weapons of Mass Deception.
McCombs and Shaw were conducting studies to determine media agenda as early as 1968, and their research expanded into correlating media and public agendas during the 1976 presidential campaign. Patterns were noted in which the media’s agenda led the way for specific issues to become major parts of the public agenda approximately four to six weeks after first news presentation. With the rapidly accelerated 24-hour news cycle of 21st-century mass communication, those four to six weeks have likely been trimmed to a matter of days.
Schechter takes the relationship between media and public concerns all the way back to Vietnam, drawing parallels between correspondents’ willingness, if not aggressiveness, in uncovering war atrocities and American public disapproval of the war as a whole. The United States military learned its lesson, placing restrictions on war correspondents over the places they would be allowed to access and what they would be allowed to witness. By the time of the 1991 war in the Persian Gulf, shots of whiz-bang weaponry and big explosions witnessed from distance took the place of stacked-up corpses in front of the few cameras that were able to capture battlefield images.
By the time of September 11, 2001, any plans to topple totalitarian regimes such as Saddam Hussein’s in Iraq needed substantial groundswells of public support, and Schechter depicts media outlets as more than willing to assist. Statistics are noted that claim over 70 percent of news sources during a three-week span in early 2003 were pro-war voices, allowing the government to keep its message moving smoothly to the American public. Those annoying people milling about in the streets and waving anti-war placards? They were shown in wide shots, pictures were displayed of their signs, but very few voices were heard offering any cogent anti-war sentiment. If protesters were heard, it was as a group, chanting melodious slogans.
Going right along with the media’s ethos of assisting dissemination of military messages, the war correspondents were able to stick around Baghdad and other assorted war zones because, as independent reporter Robert Young Pelton puts it, “…if you’re gonna have shock and awe, you need somebody to record it.” The media were having their agenda set for them in exchange for continued access. Even the idea of “embedding” troops with military divisions came with ground rules that reporters feared to violate, lest the Pentagon yank them out and send them home, never to set foot on the battlefield again. Surrounding the correspondents with gung-ho young troops prepared to die for their country, forcing them to share the hardships of war together, was almost certain to color the coverage, removing any motivation to question or criticize any of the government’s choices or the soldiers’ methods in carrying out those orders.
McCombs and Shaw coined the term “need for orientation” to describe the people who are most likely to have their world perceptions shaped by media reports. Relevance (amount of concern) and uncertainty (lack of knowledge) were both in high supply during the war in Iraq. Middle America was highly concerned about threats by terrorists, whether from Iraq or elsewhere, a concern that was repeatedly and sometimes gleefully stoked by media reports linking Saddam with such attacks. Thus, stories about what was happening were relevant. At the same time, American audiences had no access to the inner workings of military planning overseas, so every word that came across the airwaves carried the same air of truth as every other word on other channels. It all depended on a viewer’s news source of choice. After all, the reporters were there and we were not, so they obviously knew what was happening much better than we did.
Schechter mentions that the military considered the war a product to be marketed, much like a new soft drink or toothpaste. Concerns about how the fighting was to be packaged went all the way down to the name. The conflict was originally code-named “Operation Iraqi Liberation” until strategists noted that such a name carried an unfortunately telling acronym. Painting the war as a patriotic defense of liberty in the face of terrorism would go over like a fart in church if the operation was code-named “O.I.L.” Such a gaffe would completely undermine the Bush administration’s effort to influence public support and behavior.
Weapons of Mass Deception (which you can watch here)shines an unflattering light on the United States government, exposing parlor tricks designed to keep the media at arms’ length. The fact that such capital and effort is expended to shape the message that is presented to Middle America indicates that the government is highly versed in McCombs and Shaw’s agenda-setting theory, and it’s not above exploiting that knowledge to rally support to its own pet causes. If it perverts freedom of the press, spits on freedom of speech, and paints media outlets into a self-serving, money-grubbing, ratings-grabbing corner…well, that can all be written off as “collateral damage,” can’t it?